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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent nationally televised address, President Ronald Reagan
declared an all out, no-holds-barred "war on drugs." In the State of
Nebraska, however, the war on drugs was already well underway.
This note focuses on one battle in that war; a battle wherein state con-
stitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures,
were effectively emasculated by a majority of the Nebraska Supreme
Court. Through its holding in State v. Havlat2, the court refused to
legitimize privacy expectations in Nebraska's "open fields", 3 and has
left law enforcement and litigants uncertain as to when, if ever, state
1. The relevant provision of the Nebraska Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 7.
2. 222 Neb. 554, 385 N.W.2d 436 (1986).
3. Id. at 561, 385 N.W.2d at 441.
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constitutional guarantees will rise above the federal floor.4 The
court's decision in Havlat fails on both substantive and methodological
grounds.
In order to analyze the Havlat decision, it will be necessary to ex-
amine the substantive rationale in Havlat and Oliver v. United States,5
upon which the Havlat majority relied almost exclusively.6 The
method of state constitutional interpretation used in Havlat will be
explored, and suggestions for future state constitutional analysis will
be made.
II. THE HAVLAT DECISION
A. The Facts
On July 26, 1983, officers from the Nebraska State Patrol con-
ducted a low-level photographic flight over rural land in eastern Ne-
braska upon which they suspected marijuana cultivation.7 Using a
4. The "federal floor" is the level below which, because of the selective incorpora-
tion of certain rights by the fourteenth amendment, state action cannot fall. In
other words, federal constitutional guarantees represent a minimum requirement
standard to which the states must adhere. See, Williams, State Constitutional
Law Processes, 24 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 169 (1983). As the Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted, however, states are free to interpret their own constitutional
provisions more expansively than their federal counterparts. "Our holding, of
course, does not affect the State's power to impose higher standards on searches
and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so."
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); See also, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,
719 (1975).
5. 466 U.S. 170 (1984). Oliver and its companion case, Maine v. Thornton, were
heard by the Court "to clarify confusion that has arisen as to the continued vital-
ity" of the "open fields doctrine." Id. at 173. The Court went on to hold that the
fourth amendment did not proscribe searches of "open fields," even absent a war-
rant or probable case. Id. at 177.
6. After citing only one Nebraska case, and after a brief overview of the rationale
advanced in Oliver, the court stated:
Without a further recitation of the rationale set forth by the majority in
Oliver, we find persuasive the reasons advanced in Oliver for concluding
that no constitutional protection attaches to Havlat's activities occurring
in the open fields, that Havlat had no legitimate expectation of privacy
under the facts here, and that police could enter and search the open
field without probable cause or a search warrant.
State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 561, 385 N.W.2d 436, 441 (1986).
7. Id. at 555, 385 N.W. 2d at 438. The constitutional validity of aerial surveillance is
directly tied to the "open fields doctrine" in certain situations. If, as the Supreme
Court held in Oliver, there can be no legitimate expectation of privacy in an open
field, and if the field is not within the purview of fourth amendment protection,
then it follows that governmental intrusion into fields can take place in any man-
ner the government chooses to use. A number of courts have specifically relied
on the "open fields doctrine" to validate aerial surveillance of farmland. See
Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973); State v.
Stachler, 58 Hawaii 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977).
In Stachler, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that, as a matter of state constitu-
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telephoto lens, the officers were able to detect and photograph what
they believed to be marijuana growing on the farmland of Lumir and
Valerie Havlat, the parents of the defendant.8 The defendant, Terry
Havlat, farmed the acreage in partnership with his parents.9
On July 28, 1983, State Patrol officers went to the border of the
Havlat farm, crawled through a fence (the gates were locked), and
walked approximately one quarter of a mile to the area where they
believed marijuana to be located.1O The officers did not possess, nor
had they sought, a search warrant to authorize their entry onto the
Havlat land.11 Additional warrantless intrusions upon the farm were
made on July 29, and on August 2, 4, 5, and 8, 1983.12 On all occasions,
officers ignored posted "No Trespassing" signs to monitor suspicious
activity on the Havlat farm.
On August 8, 1983, Terry Havlat was arrested on the farm by of-
ficers equipped with cameras and shotguns.' 3 Both officers admitted
that their primary purpose in entering upon the farmland was to pur-
sue a criminal investigation, and not merely to eradicate the illicit
weeds.14
tional law, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from
aerial surveillance. The Hawaii Constitution contains a provision that protects
individuals from "sophisticated electronic surveillance techniques." Holding that
the defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches had not been vio-
lated, the court concluded that using binoculars from a helicopter to view the
defendant's field was not unreasonable. Id. at 421, 510 P.2d at 1329. In determin-
ing whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy from overflight
searches, courts have focused on the altitude of the aircraft, Dean v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973); the speed of the aircraft
during surveillance, People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146
(1973); and the intensity of the aerial observation. Id.
At least one court has affirmed the possibility that aerial surveillance may be
unconsitiutional as a matter of state constitutional law. State v. Myrick, 102
Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984). In Myrick, police obtained inculpatory evi-
dence by flying at an altitude of 1,500 feet and observing, with the naked eye,
marijuana growing on the defendant's land. After rejecting the state's claim that
the search was legal in light of the open fields doctrine, the court held that the
overflight observation was nonintrusive. Id. at 508, 688 P.2d at 155. While the
court rejected the Hester and Oliver open fields doctrine, it did so primarily be-
cause of textual differences between the state and federal constitutional prohibi-
tions of unreasonable searches and seizures. See infra notes 104 and 105.
8. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 555-56, 385 N.W.2d 436, 438 (1986).
9. Id. at 556, 385 N.W.2d at 438.
10. Id.
11. Id. "There is nothing in the record to indicate that with that information [the
results of the aerial surveillance] the officers could not have obtained a warrant
to search the area; there were no exigent circumstances shown here." Id. at 567,
385 N.W.2d at 444 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 556, 385 N.W.2d at 438.
13. Id. at 569, 385 N.W.2d at 445 (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
14. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 385 N.W.2d 436 (1986).
This fact would sufficiently rebut the state's contention that the searches were
[Vol. 66:844
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At trial, the defendant successfully moved to suppress evidence ob-
tained as a result of the intrusions, the court basing its decision on
fourth amendment grounds.15 The state perfected an interlocutory
appeal1 6, and a single judge of the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed
the suppression order.17
On remand, the trial court, on its own motion, once again sup-
pressed the evidence as obtained in violation of article I, section 7 of
the Nebraska Constitution. 8 Again the state appealed, and again the
motion of the trial court was reversed.19 The defendant was subse-
quently convicted of manufacturing marijuana, sentenced to a term of
not less than 20 months nor greater than 40 months in the Nebraska
Penal and Correctional Complex, and fined $1,000 plus the costs of
prosecution.2 0 The defendant then appealed his conviction, seeking an
opinion regarding the constitutionality of the warrantless intrusions
from the entire supreme court.2 1
B. The Havlat Decision
A divided court affirmed Terry Havlat's conviction. In so doing,
the court enunciated the proposition that "our state constitution does
allowable under NEB. REv. STAT.. § 28-429(1)(d) (1985). That statute authorizes
warrantless entries of uninhabited buildings or undeveloped land for the purpose
of "locating, eradicating, and destroying wild or illicit growth of plant species
from which controlled substances may be extracted." Id. Since the avowed pur-
pose of the officers' warrantless intrusions were apparently not within the ambit
of the statute, the statute could not shelter their activities.
15. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 556, 385 N.W.2d 436, 438 (1986).
16. Interlocutory appeals of this nature are authorized by NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-824
(1985), which provides:
In addition to any other right to appeal, the state shall have the right to
appeal from an order granting a motion for the return of seized property
and to suppress evidence in the manner herein provided. Where such
motion has been granted in district court, the Attorney General, or the
county attorney or prosecuting officer with the consent of the Attorney
General, may file his or her application with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court asking for a summary review of the order granting the motion.
The statute goes on to explain some of the procedural requirements of these in-
terlocutory appeals, and also reserves for the defendant the right to challenge the
order of the single judge upon conviction.
17. State v. Havlat, 217 Neb. 791, 351 N.W.2d 86 (1984).
18. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 557, 385 N.W.2d 436, 438 (1986). For the text of NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 7, see supra note 1.
19. State v. Havlat, 218 Neb. 602, 357 N.W.2d 464 (1984). While Justice White's hold-
ing in the first appeal was based entirely on the Supreme Court's decision in Oli-
ver, the holding in this second appeal was based on Justice White's belief that a
majority of the court would choose not to "adopt an exclusionary rule based on
the Nebraska Constitution." State v. Havlat, 218 Neb. 602, 603, 357 N.W.2d 464
(1984). The question of the vitality of the exclusionary rule under the Nebraska
Constitution is a matter outside the scope of this note.
20. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 555, 385 N.W.2d 436, 437-38 (1986).
21. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-824 (1985), supra note 16.
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not afford more protection than does the fourth amendment to the
federal constitution as interpreted in Oliver."22 This statement, as
well as the decision in Havlat itself, implicates two separate conclu-
sions drawn by the Oliver Court: 1) fields are not within the "persons,
houses, papers, and effects" sought to be protected by the fourth
amendment, and; 2) fields do not give rise to a legitimate expectation
of privacy and therefore the decision is consistent with prior
caselaw.23 The Nebraska Supreme Court explicitly adopted the rea-
soning and result of Oliver.24
C. The Havlat Dissents
Chief Justice Krivosha and Justice Shanahan both filed dissenting
opinions. Chief Justice Krivosha proclaimed that he was "persuaded
in part by the dissent of Justice Marshall in Oliver."25 Focusing pri-
marily upon the inconsistency between the Court's holding in Oliver
and its holding in previous cases, 26 the Chief Justice found irreconcila-
ble results. After noting that property rights are still important when
determining whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of pri-
22. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 561, 385 N.W.2d 436, (1986).
23. "Legitimate expectation of privacy" analysis originated with Justice Harlan's con-
currence in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Supreme
Court held that warrantless wiretapping of a public telephone was violative of the
fourth amendment. Prior decisions had required actual physical invasion in or-
der for there to be a constitutional violation. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Holding these cases
outdated, Justice Stewart declared "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Defining when a person has a "legitimate expectation of privacy," requires a
two-tiered analysis. First the individual must demonstrate a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy. Secondly, that expectation must "be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable'." Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In defining the
legitimate expectation of privacy, Justice Harlan set the contemporary tone of
fourth amendment analysis.
24. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 561, 385 N.W.2d 436, 441 (1986). See also supra note
6.
25. Id. at 564, 385 N.W.2d at 442 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
26. In Oliver, the court attempted to fashion its decision in a manner consistent with
prior decisions. As the dissent pointed out, however:
[N]either a public telephone booth nor a conversation conducted therein
can fairly be described as a person, house, paper, or effect; yet we have
held that the Fourth Amendment forbids the police without a warrant to
eavesdrop on such a conversation. Katz v. United States, [citations, omit-
ted). Nor can it plausibly be argued that an office or commercial estab-
lishment is covered by the plain language of the Amendment; yet we
have held that such premises are entitled to constitutional protection if
they are marked in a fashion that alerts the public to the fact that they
are private. [citations omitted].
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 185-86 (1984)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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vacy, he concluded that Havlat did have such an expectation.27 Be-
cause the search was conducted without a warrant, it should be per se
unreasonable.
Justice Shanahan's dissent distinguished prior Nebraska case law,
focused on the subjective attempts by Havlat to assert and preserve
privacy on his land, and announced a "more plausible" test for deter-
mining whether the state constitution had been violated.28 Relying on
the test outlined by Justice Harlan in Katz,29 Justice Shanahan would
ask "1) Has the person exhibited a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy?" 3 0 If the answer to this question is yes, then the court must
determine if 2) such expectation of privacy has been violated by "un-
reasonable governmental intrusion."31 Justice Shanahan also posited
an additional reason for excluding the evidence: officers had violated
criminal trespass laws in obtaining the evidence. 32 Finally, he noted,
the Nebraska Supreme Court "should not exhibit some pavlovian
conditioned reflex in an uncritical adoption of federal" decisional law
as controlling the meaning of the Nebraska Constitution.33
III. ANALYSIS
A. Substantive Analysis: The Wisdom of the Open Fields Doctrine in
Nebraska.
The arguments supporting the decision in Havlat can be catego-
rized into three general areas: 1) arguments dealing with the inten-
tion of the framers (roughly based on literal interpretation3 4 of the
constitution itself); 2) arguments supporting the need for effective and
practical law enforcement,3 5 and; 3) arguments focusing on the rea-
sonableness of the privacy expectation being asserted.36
27. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 566, 385 N.W.2d 436, 443-44, (1986). (Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting).
28. Id. at 571, 385 N.W.2d at 446 (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
29. See supra note 23.
30. Id. at 571, 385 N.W.2d at 446 (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 572, 385 N.W.2d at 447 (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 573, 385 N.W.2d at 447 (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
34. There is some question as to whether the literal constitutional interpretation
scheme employed by the Oliver and Havlat courts has any independent signifi-
cance. Certainly, this sort of literal interpretation cannot be squared with the
liberal interpretation advocated in Katz. Even Justice Marshall, dissenting in
Oliver, opined "that the plain-language theory sketched in Part II of the Court's
opinion will have little or no effect on our future decisions in this area." Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 188 n.7 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
36. The court in Havlat relied in part on its earlier decision in State v. Cemper, 209
Neb. 376, 307 N.W.2d 820 (1981), to hold that a person's capacity to claim state
constitutional violation was dependent upon his or her ability to show that a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy had been violated. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554,
1987]
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The order in which the Oliver Court addressed the issues is illus-
trative of their reasoning. The Court first declared that real property
is not within the plain language of the fourth amendment, then went
on to point out that this conclusion was consistent with Katz v. United
States. 37 In ruling on the plain-language of the amendment, the court
noted that the original constitutional framers had rejected James
Madison's proposed amendment, which would have protected a per-
son's "possessions" from unlawful intrusion.38 Arguing that "posses-
sions" is more inclusive than "effects" 39, the Court concluded that by
rejecting the Madison Language, the framers intended to limit the
scope of fourth amendment protection. The unstated implication is
that, had the framers used the broader term "possessions" rather
than "effects", fields may have been constitutionally protected.40 The
Nebraska Supreme Court found nothing in its own constitutional his-
tory that would lead to a different conclusion.41
The literal interpretation approach used in Havlat and Oliver is at
odds with prior interpretations of the fourth amendment and article I,
section 7. Furthermore, literal interpretation represents a dangerous
departure from previous constitutional interpretation methods.
While apparently not overruling Katz, the Oliver Court failed to
explain how a public telephone booth had been transformed into a
person's "effect", consistent with literal interpretation. 42 Addition-
ally, the Nebraska Supreme Court has specifically held that constitu-
tional protection of article I, section 7 extends to pornographic films
located in a place of business43 in spite of the fact that the business
place cannot be classified as a "house" or "effect". 44 Conversely, the
560, 385 N.W.2d 436, 440 (1986). One questions whether this ability is truly crucial
in the Havlat case, given the court's subsequent statement that art. I, § 7 cannot
be interpreted to mean "more than what it says." Id. at 561, 385 N.W.2d at 440.
Apparently, the court is attempting to invoke the literal interpretation analysis
used in Oliver, which would make the reasonableness of the privacy expectation
irrelevant. See supra note 34.
37. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 177 n.7.
40. Interestingly, at least two states have interpreted their constitutional search and
seizure provisions, which include protection of "possessions," to nonetheless ex-
clude protection of "open fields." See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
41. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 561, 385 N.W.2d 436, 440 (1986).
42. One cannot help but notice that the literal language of art. I, § 7 and the fourth
amendment requires possession for the interest to be protected. The word
"their" implies that one must possess in order to claim protection. Since the de-
fendant in Katz had no ownership interest in the telephone booth, strictly literal
interpretation would lead inevitably to the conclusion that there could be no con-
stitutional protection.
43. State v. Skolnik, 218 Neb. 667, 358 N.W.2d 497 (1984).
44. The court's holding in Skolnik is consistent with Supreme Court opinions on the
fourth amendment's protection of business places. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
[Vol. 66:844
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Supreme Court has noted that automobiles, certainly classifiable as
"effects" under the fourth amendment, are nonetheless entitled to
only limited constitutional protection.4 5
The literal interpretation used in Havlat and Oliver has an even
more disturbing effect: internal inconsistency. The Court has defined
"open fields" as including "any unoccupied or undeveloped area
outside the curtilage."46 Conversely, the Court defined the curtilage
as "the area around the home to which the activity of home life ex-
tends."47 Thus, real property inside the curtilage is protected by the
fourth amendment, while real property on the outside of the curtilage
is not. In order to arrive at this anomalous conclusion, the Court is
forced to employ a definitional fiction; while most would define
"house" as a structural construct, the Court apparently defines
"house" as the construct plus some unspecified area surrounding the
construct. Fictions of this sort undermine the rationales which support
436 U.S. 307, 311 (1977); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 335
(1977). Even the dissent in Marshall, which advocated denial of constitutional
protection on the facts of that case, proclaimed that "businesses are unquestiona-
bly entitled to Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 335 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
45. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The justification originally given for
lessened constitutional protections in autos was the mobility of the automobile.
Id. at 153. The Court has since noted that an individual in an auto has reduced
expectations of privacy. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
Thus, the justification given for the automobile exception to the warrant require-
ment is twofold: 1) mobility creates "exigent circumstances" that justify a search
without a warrant, and; 2) individuals in automobiles have a reduced expectation
of privacy. Neither of these justifications appear to be drawn from the text of the
fourth amendment, and neither are consistent with literal interpretation of the
Constitution.
One might question whether the second justification, reduced expectation of
privacy, carries any weight in the light of California v. Carney, 471 U.S.386,
(1985). In Carney, the Court upheld the search of the defendant's mobile home.
In upholding the search, the Court stressed mobility factors rather than privacy
factors. Id. at 394 n.3. It could be possible, therefore, to recognize an automobile
as an "effect" under the fourth amendment, and yet allow warrantless automo-
bile searches on the basis of exigent circumstances alone. One must note, how-
ever, that even the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement
cannot be derived through literal interpretation. The fourth amendment simply
does not include a proviso to the prohibition against unreasonable searches.
46. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). The Court went on to note that
an open field "need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used in
common speech." Indeed, the open fields doctrine has been used to uphold
searches of swamps, Commonwealth v. Lewis, 346 Mass. 373, 191 N.E.2d 753
(1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 (1964); wooded areas, Bedell v. State, 257 Ark.
895, 521 S.W.2d 200 (1975); beaches, Anderson v. State, 133 Ga.App. 45, 209 S.E.2d
665 (1974); and even a fenced-in cave, Stark v. United States, 44 F.2d 946 (8th Cir.
1930).
47. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984). For various court definitions
of the area encompassed by the curtilage, see Note, Oliver and the Open Fields
Doctrine, 7 CAMPBELL L. REv. 253, 267-68 (1984).
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literal interpretation: loyalty to the text of the constitution and
certainty.
Additionally, literal interpretation fails to mesh with prior philoso-
phies of constitutional interpretation. In Boyd v. United States48, Jus-
tice Bradley declared that literal interpretation of constitutional
provisions "deprives them of half their efficacy and leads to a gradual
depreciation of the right."49 Disfavor of literal interpretation was reit-
erated in Gouled v. United States,5 O where the Court declared that the
guarantees of both the fourth and fifth amendments should be con-
strued liberally.
Literal interpretation, then, fails to fulfill the spirit of a constitu-
tion. The court in Havlat relied partially on the Oliver Court's plain-
language reasoning, adding that "nowhere in our individual research
do we find evidence that the framers intended the explicit language of
article I, § 7 to encompass more than what it says."s1 Certainly the
court did not expect to find such evidence. Apparently the framers of
the Nebraska Constitution modeled their own prohibition against un-
reasonable search and seizure after the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution. They could not have intended, however,
that the meaning of article I, section 7 track precisely with fourth
amendment interpretation, no matter how restrictive or broad federal
interpretation became.52 Furthermore, the framers of the Nebraska
Constitution would have been aware of the judicial tendency to inter-
pret constitutions broadly,53 and so would have selected language ca-
pable of flexibility.
The second major justification given for exempting open fields
from the warrant requirement is that the need for effective law en-
forcement justifies the result.54 There are several flaws in the reason-
48. 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
49. Id. at 635. One writer has hypothesized that "gradual depreciation" may indeed
be the goal of the Court in this area. "Any retreat from Katz must be slow and
deliberate, much like the current trend against the exclusionary rule." Note, The
Open Fields Doctrine Survives Katz, 63 N.C.L. REv. 546 (1985).
50. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
51. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 561, 385 N.W.2d 436, 440 (1986).
52. When federal fourth amendment law broadened to exclude evidence illegally ob-
tained, state courts were reluctant to read their constitutions as broadly.
53. See McCulloch v. Maryland, U. S. 159, 316 (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). A constitution
is not a legal code; "[ilts nature... requires, that only its great outlines should be
marked, its important objects designated .... Id. at 407.
54. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984). While not specifically cited as a
reason for adopting the open fields doctrine in Havlat, the court's citation to the
reasoning of Oliver suggests that they found this justification persuasive. See
supra note 6.
One major reason given for law enforcement need was that officers "in the
field" would be unable to detect whether a specific tract of land had been suffi-
ciently demarcated to warrant fourth amendment protection. Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
[Vol. 66:844
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ing supporting this justification. First, law enforcement is not made
less complex by the application of the courts' field-curtilage dichot-
omy. Given the Court's nebulous definition of curtilage55 , it is no won-
der that so many courts have struggled with the application of such a
definition.56 Law enforcement may also be struggling with the field-
curtilage issue. That officers on investigation can quickly and accu-
rately make judgments about concepts with which courts struggle
seems doubtful.
In announcing this rule, courts have also expressed concern about
law enforcement's ability to tell when or if a landowner has subjec-
tively manifested his own privacy interests sufficiently to warrant con-
stitutional protection.57 This concern is contrary to positive law.
Criminal trespass statutes such as Nebraska's5s provide standards that
forbid intrusions onto land that is sufficiently demarcated.59 Citizens
are expected to know and apply these standards in order to conform
their behavior to the law; it is doubtful that officers would be unable
to abide by the laws that they are expected to enforce. If officers com-
mit criminal trespass, argued Justice Shanahan in dissent in Havlat,
they breach article I, section 7 of the Nebraska Constitution.
The majority in Oliver, however, believed that using the criminal
trespass standard for determining constitutional violations was erro-
neous. 60 They argued that "the law of trespass, however, forbids intru-
sions upon land that the Fourth Amendment would not proscribe."61
Criminal trespass laws, unlike the fourth amendment, it is argued,
protect against intruders who "poach, steal livestock and crops, or van-
dalize property."62 The fourth amendment, the majority contended,
vindicates primarily privacy interests. Thus, it was concluded, prop-
erty rights protected by the law "of trespass have little or no relevance
to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment."63
The Court's analysis here fails in two respects. Initially, while it
must be conceded that a landowner's right to exclude protects his
property rights, it cannot be said that property rights are not some-
what protected by the law of trespass. Clearly, the right to exclude
55. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
56. Note, supra note 47, at 267-68.
57. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
58. NEB. REV. STAT. 28-521 (1985).
59. Under Nebraska law, one commits second degree criminal trespass if one stays or
remains on land as to which trespass notice is given by: (a) actual communication
to the intruder; (b) "[plosting in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely
to come to the attention of the intruders; or (c) [f]encing or other enclosure mani-
festly designed to exclude intruders." NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-521(1) (1985).
60. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984).
61. Id.
62. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 n.15 (1984).
63. Id. at 184.
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protects both privacy and property interests; the two are not mutually
exclusive. Secondly, as the Court in Katz noted:
the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional
'right of privacy'. That Amendment protects individual privacy against cer-
tain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often
have nothing to do with privacy at all. 64
It is, therefore, entirely consistent to protect constitutional rights
through application of a criminal trespass standard. Furthermore, this
standard is one with which citizens and law enforcement are familiar;
there should be no trouble in applying its tenets in the field. Lastly,
while the needs of law enforcement may be a legitimate concern, "the
mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never
by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment."65
The final justification given for exempting open fields from the
warrant requirement is the conclusion espoused in Havlat and Oliver
that, no matter what a person does to exhibit an expectation of privacy
in an area outside the curtilage, society is not prepared to recognize
that expectation as reasonable. 66 Whether an individual could claim a
legitimate expectation of privacy, 67 the courts reasoned, was depen-
dent upon a number of factors: the intention of the framers of the
constitution, 68 the uses to which the invaded space are put, and a socie-
tal understanding that certain places should remain immune from
governmental invasion.
Without a doubt, the fields at issue in these cases harbor less activ-
ity than a home, but that in itself fails to justify the assumption that
per se no protected activity ever takes place. Given the recent political
farm activism, arguably activities contemplated for protection under
both the fourth amendment and article I, section 7 of the Nebraska
Constitution are on the increase in this state. Furthermore, the dis-
sent in Oliver cited numerous potential open field activities deserving
of constitutional protection: "landowners use their secluded spaces to
meet lovers, others to gather together with fellow worshippers, still
others to engage in sustained creative endeavor."6 9
Farming is no less a business than operating a movie theater; yet
the court protects one business from governmental intrusion and fails
to protect the other. Farming is different from many other business
activities in that much of the farming activity takes place out-of-doors
64. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
65. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
66. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984); State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 560,
385 N.W.2d 436, 440 (1986).
67. While Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz was the basis for the legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy analysis, the term and test of "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" was first used to decide a case in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
68. See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
69. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 192 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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in areas easily seen by the public. Such activity would not be entitled
to fourth amendment protection, as all land easily seen from the
farm's borders would receive diminished constitutional protection
under the plain view doctrine.70 The "open fields" exception to the
warrant requirement, however, extends much further than the plain
view exception. The open fields doctrine permits a warrantless search
if the area searched is outside the curtilage, regardless of whether the
land is easily seen from the farm border. Thus, a farmer engaged in
perfectly legal business activity on a remote, secluded portion of his
land is nonetheless vulnerable to arbitrary governmental intrusion.
Business people working indoors, even in areas less secluded, are ap-
propriately protected from such intrusions.
When analyzing the reasonableness of an asserted expectation of
privacy, the courts stress that the focus should be on society's expecta-
tions. If society declares a privacy expectation reasonable, then that
interest is worthy of fourth amendment protection. Unfortunately,
the court in Havlat seemed to adopt the Supreme Court's conclusion
that such expectations in fields are unreasonable.
When analyzing the reasonableness of a privacy interest for state
constitutional purposes, the court should confine the definition of "so-
ciety" to the population of that particular state. The population of Ne-
braska may, for example, be more prone to respect an asserted right of
privacy by a farmer than the population of New Jersey. Indeed, as the
appellant noted on brief in Havlat, "the welfare of this large commu-
nity is, for all practical purposes, completely dependent upon the busi-
ness of agriculture." 71 The court in Havlat erred by failing to consider
the unique population of the State of Nebraska; inquiry into the rea-
sonableness of the right to privacy asserted by Havlat should have
been limited to the values and beliefs of the people of Nebraska.
Instead of clearly analyzing the objective reasonableness of the as-
serted right, the Havlat court relied upon a conclusionary statement of
dicta from its previous holding in State v. Cemper:72
In the rural areas of this state it would be difficult to find a landowner who
would believe that no person would enter on his open field without permis-
sion. Hunters, fishermen, and other technical trespassers are so commonly ex-
pected in the rural areas of this state that a failure to post trespassing signs is
70. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
71. Brief for Appellant at 15, State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 385 N.W.2d 436 (1986).
72. 209 Neb. 376, 307 N.W.2d 820 (1981). In Cemper, an officer accompanied by an
informant entered through an open gate on farmland to seize marijuana. The
defendant, who had no possessory interest in the land, claimed that his fourth
amendment rights had been violated by the warrantless intrusion. The court,
basing their decision on the lack of a legitimate privacy interest, stated that "[i]t is
incomprehensible that an employee, who has no personal ownership or posses-
sory interest in an open field, should have a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id.
at 382, 307 N.W.2d at 823.
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regarded by many persons as almost an implied permission to enter.7 3
Justice Shanahan in dissent characterized this assertion as "quixotic, a
questionable concept for constitutional law, and an inaccurate charac-
terization of the situation encountered by one without consent hunt-
ing and emerging from a field of cornstalks to find a scowling
landowner who does not view the interloper as a recreational
licensee."74
The people of Nebraska, through legislative action, have acknowl-
edged the landowner's right to exclude trespassers. 75 Given the facts
in Havlat, it is clear that citizen intrusion would have resulted in viola-
tion of the law. Relying on the frequency of these wrongful entries to
exempt an area from constitutional protection seems dangerous. The
frequency of wrongful intrusions into a home or office will not dimin-
ish the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy asserted therein.
Why should illegal intrusions into a field be treated any differently?
The right to exclude others from one's property is a crucial factor
in determining the legitimacy of the privacy interests asserted therein.
"[O]ne who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all
likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of [his]
right to exclude."76 In certain areas, however, some sort of subjective
privacy assertion needs to be made in order to invoke constitutional
protection. An "open" field is one of these areas; absent an indication
to prospective intruders that their presence on the land is unwelcome,
such fields should be presumed accessible.77 Under the facts of Havlat,
however, police and citizens alike should be forced to abide by the rea-
sonable exclusionary powers exercised by a landowner. As the Court
in Katz stated, what a person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 7 8
The substantive shortfalls of the Havlat decision are further exac-
erbated by the facts of Havlat. The scope and duration of the warrant-
less entries onto the Havlat farm were severe; officers entered and
surveyed the site no less than four times without a warrant. 79 Addi-
tionally, as Justice Shanahan noted in dissent, officers walked "a half
mile to reach the haystack pinpointed at 1,320 feet west of the county
73. Id. at 381-82, 307 N.W.2d at 823, quoted in State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 560, 385
N.W.2d 436, 440 (1986).
74. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 572, 385 N.W.2d 436, 447 (1986) (Shanahan, J., dis-
senting). Justice Shanahan also noted that the Cemper opinion, relied upon by
the majority, was adopted by only two justices of the court, with the remaining
five concurring in the judgment.
75. See supra note 58.
76. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
77. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 193-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
79. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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road"80 , suggesting that the officers were on a general investigatory
search of all of the Havlat farm. It is these types of abuses of scope
and duration that the warrant requirement was intended to alleviate.
Because of these and the other mentioned substantive analytical
shortfalls of the open fields doctrine, the court in Havlat should have
chosen to abandon the concept for the more reasonable, and easier
applied criminal trespass standard.
B. Methodological Analysis: The Folly of Following the Federal Lead.
Out of necessity, and in order to show the inconsistency of prior
substantive case law, this note has focused not only on the history and
interpretation of article I, section 7, but also on the fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution. This fact is partially due to a long
dry spell of state constitutional interpretation which was due, in turn,
to the "selective incorporation" of federal constitutional rights. "Se-
lective incorporation" makes certain federal constitutional rights ap-
plicable to the states.8 1 As a result of this incorporation, state courts,
until recently, have been dormant when it comes to independent in-
terpretation of their own constitutions.8 2
In a sense, then, independent state constitutional interpretation
necessitates reference to, at least in part, federal decisions interpreting
an analogous federal guarantee. Just how much weight should be ac-
corded those federal decisions is a more controversial matter. Cer-
tainly, as the Supreme Court has recognized, state courts are free to
ignore federal guidelines when interpreting their own state constitu-
tion.8 3 Indeed, even before Haviat, one justice of the Nebraska
Supreme Court had openly advocated abandoning a federal fourth
amendment standard, favoring application of a broader standard based
on article I, section 7 of the Nebraska Constitution.8 4 In order to de-
termine whether divergence from federal constitutional standards was
mandated in the Havlat case, it will be necessary to first examine the
justifications given for such divergence, and then turn to the methods
of independent constitutional analysis available to the court in Haviat.
Lastly, this note will examine the reasoning and result of the few state
80. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 570, 385 N.W.2d 436, 446 (1986) (Shanahan, J.,
dissenting).
81. See generally Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment,
73 YALE L. J. 74 (1963). This selective incorporation, which in essence was an
attempt at nationalizing criminal procedural guarantees, first began in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
82. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1141, 1147 (1985).
83. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
84. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 775-76, 336 N.W.2d 97, 100-01 (1983) (White, J., con-
curring). See also, Note, Closing the Gates: A Nebraska Constitutional Standard
for Search and Seizure, 63 NEB. L. REV. 514 (1984).
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courts that have determined the vitality of the open fields doctrine
under their own constitutions.
State constitutional law process has, very recently, become a topic
of keen academic interest.8 5 Commentators have noted that state
court judges often look to their state constitution for justifications to
depart from Supreme Court constitutional interpretation. Chief
among the justifications offered for divergence are notions of federal-
ism that, in some instances, may indicate a true need for independent
constitutional analysis even when no textual differences exist between
state and federal constitutions.
At least two justices on the current Court have noted that constitu-
tional guarantees lose some of their efficacy when applied to state
rather than federal actions.8 6 Some feared that the adoption of the
"selective incorporation" doctrine would lead to a dilution of constitu-
tional guarantees.8 7 That notions of federalism constrain Supreme
Court analysis of governmental action is most obvious in San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,8 8 where the Court declined to strictly
scrutinize Texas' system of public school financing because of "poten-
tial impact on our federal system."
No such concerns were voiced in the Oliver decision, however.
Nonetheless, a recognition that such factors influence the Court's rea-
soning provides an impetus for state courts to engage in independent
state constitutional interpretation.
Further encouragement for such independence is provided by a va-
riety of other factors. First, state court judges are, in certain areas
(such as criminal procedure), more familiar with administering work-
able procedural formulations.8 9 Clearly in Havlat the need for an eas-
85. For the most recent and expansive compilation of articles on the subject, see Sym-
posium: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985).
Other articles dealing with state constitutional interpretation include: Dix, Ex-
clusionary Rule Issues as Matters of State Law, 11 Am. J. CRIM. L. 109 (1983);
Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of
Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353 (1984); Williams, State
Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169 (1983); Wright, In
Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11 HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q.
165 (1984); Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
86. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52-53 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 291 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Justice Harlan was the first to warn of this potential for dilution in Ker v. Cali-
fornia, 374 U.S. 23, 45-46 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring). More recently, Justice
Powell expressed his opinion that selective incorporation had actually resulted in
the "dilution of federal rights." Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring).
88. 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973).
89. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of
Supreme Court Reasoning and Result 35 S.C.L. REV. 353, 400 (1984).
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ily applied rule was paramount. 90 Second, a dropping "federal floor"
can also provide incentive for independent analysis.9 ' If, for example,
the Supreme Court interprets a federal constitutional right more nar-
rowly than it had in the past, the state court may not see fit to follow.
In such circumstances, state constitutional guarantees could "pick up
the slack."
Other, less theoretical justifications for divergence have been
noted. A New Jersey Justice has noted many, among them: 1) textual
differences between the federal and state constitutions; 2) unique state
legislative history; 3) state law predating the Supreme Court standard
being questioned; 4) subject matter of state or local interest, and; 5)
public attitudes prevalent in the state.92 It has been stressed, how-
ever, that the presence of such factors should not be a prerequisite to
independent state constitutional analysis; it is justifiable for a state
court to disagree with the Supreme Court merely because it finds con-
trary arguments more persuasive. The Supreme Court has no monop-
oly on correct constitutional analysis.
The method of state constitutional interpretation relied upon by
the majority in Havlat accorded nearly conclusive precedential power
to the Supreme Court's decision in Oliver. This method sells short the
independent significance of the Nebraska Constitution. If the guaran-
tees of a state constitution are to mean anything, they must derive
their meaning from sources independent of the federal constitution.
Commentators have frequently analyzed state constitutional deci-
sionmaking over the past five years. Of the different methods identi-
fied, all seem to fit into one of two categories: 1) interpretation based
upon "federal orientation," and; 2) "state specific" interpretation. 93
"Federal Orientation" may itself take on a number of variations; dis-
cussion might be limited to the competing arguments presented in the
most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue, or the court
may adopt as its own constitutional interpretation selected past
Supreme Court opinions (typically Warren Court opinions).94 State
specific interpretation, on the other hand, will focus either on textual
90. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
91. Commentators have noted that the Burger Court's disagreement with the protec-
tions granted by the Warren Court have been sharpest in the area of search and
seizure. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of
State Constitutional Law 63 TEx. L. REv. 1141, 1183 n.171 (1985). It seems plausi-
ble that the federal floor will continue its plunge in this area during the Rehn-
quist court era.
92. Williams, supra note 89, at 387, citing State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 363-68, 450 A.2d
952, 965-67 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Handler was also adamant
that his approach did not create a presumption of correctness for federal constitu-
tional decision. Id. at 367 n.3, 450 A.2d at 967 n.3.
93. This broad categorization was suggested in Developments in the Law: The Inter-
pretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1384-93 (1982).
94. Id. at 1389-91.
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distinction (focusing on the language of the provision being inter-
preted) or upon nontextual distinction (focusing on unique character-
istics of a given state).95
The Havlat opinion is federally oriented; moreover, the majority
primarily limits its discussion to the arguments presented in Oliver.96
Obviously, state specific textual distinction was impossible in the
Havlat case; the fourth amendment and article I, section 7,97 are iden-
tically phrased. Nontextual state specific factors were, however, con-
sidered and summarily rejected by the court.9 8 In attempting to find
non-textual factors, the court looked to the historical underpinnings
of the constitution. 99 Unfortunately, history is rarely a good nontex-
tual distinction; most state courts and legislatures have traditionally
fallen far short of the federal constitutional guarantees in criminal
procedure, especially those guarantees granted by the Warren
Court.100 Reference to the intentions of state constitutional framers
would fail to provide even the minimal constitutional protections now
required by the fourteenth amendment. History is therefore rarely
helpful when attempting to expand constitutional rights.
Due to the absence of state specific factors in many instances,
courts have been encouraged to use "state generic" factors to disassoci-
ate themselves from federal law.o1 Under this theory, states would
be entitled and justified to engage in separate constitutional analysis
merely because they are a state. Diversity between states would pro-
vide a number of working models from which future federal standards
could be borrowed. "It is one of the happy incidents of federalism that
a single courageous state may... serve as a laboratory" 10 2 for novel
interpretations of constitutional guarantees. Such a novel approach
could be supplied by interpreting article I, section 7, of the Nebraska
Constitution as conferring on the residents of Nebraska a broad "right
of security" which would be less restrictive (and coincidentally more
95. Id. at 1385-87.
96. State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 561, 385 N.W.2d 436, 441 (1986). See also supra note
6.
97. For the text of the fourth amendment and art. I, § 7, see supra note 1.
98. The court rejected the appellant's argument that Nebraska should accord greater
protection to open fields by virtue of the state's emphasis on agriculture by stat-
ing: "we note that a vast majority of the 50 states, regardless of population, have
large areas of land devoted to farming, ranching, mining, and tree production."
State v. Havlat, 222 Neb. 554, 561, 385 N.W.2d 436, 440-41 (1986). Instead of focus-
ing on square miles, however, the court's emphasis should have been on the
unique characteristics of the people of Nebraska. See supra note 71 and accompa-
nying text.
99. Id.
100. Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1393 (1982).
101. Id. at 1397-98.
102. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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in line with the language of the provision) than the current "right to
privacy" formulations. Undoubtedly, this would be a brave, risky step
toward completely independent state constitutional law. As Justice
Brandeis put it, "[i]f we would guide by the light of reason, we must let
our minds be bold."103
All six cases that pass upon the vitality of the open fields doctrine
under state constitutional guarantees are, unfortunately, cases based
exclusively upon textual distinction.104 Of these six decisions, four
were based, interestingly enough, upon the presence of the word "pos-
sessions" in place of "effects". In essence, these state provisions are
versions of the Madison formulation discussed above.105 The Court in
Oliver implied that, had the framers used the word "possessions" in-
stead of "effects", open fields would be included in protection. 06
Courts in New Hampshire and Kentucky have rejected this result,
both arguing that if every word of the constitution is to be given some
meaning, the term "possessions" cannot swallow the terms "houses,
papers".,0 7 These courts, therefore, followed the federal open fields
doctrine. Mississippi and Tennessee, on the other hand, interpret the
word "possession" to encompass "practically everything which may be
owned" 0 8 , and on this basis have included fields that are not "wild or
wasteland" for constitutional protection.109 Of the remaining two
cases, State v. Myrick 110 is the only one to provide constitutional pro-
tection of open fields. Myrick was based upon a state constitutional
clause that protected people "in their private affairs", which the court
interpreted to provide greater protection than the fourth
amendment. 1 1
IV. CONCLUSION
These cases provide examples of state court independent constitu-
tional interpretation, but their usefulness in the Havlat case is limited
by the fact that they rely solely upon textual distinction. In Nebraska,
other state specific factors should push the court towards independent
analysis. Further, institutional limitations should be kept in mind
when considering the precedential weight of Supreme Court decisions.
103. Id.
104. Brent v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 504, 240 S.W.45 (1922); Falkner v. State, 134
Miss. 253, 98 So. 691 (1924); State v. Pinder, N.H., 514 A.2d 1241 (1986); State v.
Doelman, 620 S.W.2d 96 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981); Beasley v. State, 683 S.W.2d 132
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash, 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
105. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
106. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
107. Brent v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 504, 509-10, 240 S.W. 45, 48 (1922).
108. Falkner v. State, 134 Miss 253, 257, 98 So. 691, 692 (1924).
109. State v. Doelman, 620 S.W.2d 96 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981).
110. 102 Wash.2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
111. Id.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court did define the meaning of the Ne-
braska Constitution in Havlat; they simply tied that meaning to
Supreme Court analysis. In so doing, the court left litigants without a
meaningful analytical framework upon which to rely when attempt-
ing to interpret the meaning of the Nebraska Constitution. Future
state constitutional decisions should focus not only on the substantive
question presented by the facts of the case, but also on the method-
ological analysis employed to reach the decision. Only then will the
Nebraska Constitution fulfill its role as the primary guardian of the
people's rights.
John M. Ryan '88
